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Proportionality - a 
German approach
by Yutaka ARAI-Takahashi
This article briefly discusses the nature and character of the 
principle of proportionality in relation to administrative discretion 
in German public law. The author argues that its rigorous 
application is premised on Germany's special historical context and 
its post-war determination to strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights.
I n German public law, the principle of proportionality (Verhahnismafiiykeit) is designed to measure the legitimacy for all the state organs. It is the most significant, but
o o '
controversial, principle in administrative law in relation to the 
judicial review of wrongful use of discretion. This principle is 
not expressly provided for in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, or GG), 
but it constitutes an unwritten constitutional principle of general 
importance recognised by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverjassungsgericht, BVerfG) (BVerfGE (Entscheidung des 
Bundesverjassungsgerichts) 7, 377).
The proportionality' principle has been incorporated into 
European Community law by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) which has adopted three requirements similar to those of 
German law. The growing influence of European law on national 
laws has indirectly transplanted this distinctively German 
concept to many European countries (see, e.g., F Teitgen, 'Le 
principe de proportionnalite en droit francos', in: H Kutscher 
(Joint ed.), Der Grundsatz der Verhahnismafiigkeit in europaischen 
Rechtsordnung, (1985), 53; and J Ziller, 'Le principe de 
proportionnalite' (1996), special issue, AJDA 185). In the UK, 
while some leading authors propose that this notion should be 
fully 'naturalised' into English law (J Jowell and A Lester, 
'Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative 
Law' (1987) PL 368) others argue that this principle will lower 
the threshold of Wednesbury reasonableness and entangle the 
court in a process of policy evaluation, trespassing the 
constitutionally-allocated boundaries (Lord Irvine of Lairg, 
'Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and Practice of 
Wednesbury Review' (1996) PL 59 at p. 74).
ORIGIN
The origin of proportionality in German law can be traced 
back to the principle of necessity developed in the jurisprudence 
of Prussian administrative courts in the field of police law. After 
the Kreuzberg decision (14 June 1882, PrOVG 9, 353), the 
Prussian Supreme Administrative Court examined whether the 
measures adopted by the police went beyond what was 
considered necessary for attaining a relevant objective. Since
World War II, the principle of proportionality has been applied 
not only in the field of administrative law but in all areas of 
public law and as such has gained the constitutional character 
which guides the interpretation of all the lower laws.
FIELD OF APPLICATION
The principle of proportionality applies to laws, acts and any 
legislative enactment as well as to executive and judicial actions 
implementing a relevant law, determining the constitutionality of 
law-making and law-enforcement. It serves to check and prevent 
the infringement of citizens' rights by legislative, administrative 
or judicial authorities in diverse issues. Its scope of application 
has been extended beyond the vertical context of citizens versus 
an interfering state and become established even in the 
horizontal context of citizens versus each other (see, e.g. the 
Lebach case, BVerfGE 35, 202).
LEGITIMACY
The legitimacy of proportionality is derived from the 
requirement to protect citizens' basic rights, one of the 
underlying constitutional values. The BVerfG has recognised 
proportionality as a constitutional principle on the basis of the 
principle of Rechtsstaat (rule of law or constitutional state) and 
the essence of the fundamental rights themselves. First, while 
requiring the legitimacy of all the state's actions to be compatible 
with the constitution, Rechtsstaat is designed to protect citizens' 
rights against interference by powerful state authorities. 
Secondly, the concept of human dignity enunciated in art. 
1(1)GG and the right to the free development of the individual 
guaranteed in art. 2(1 )GG preordain that citizens can enjoy the 
maximum freedom of action. No restrictions are allowed if not 
appropriate or strictly necessary for the purpose of protecting 
the interests of the public or the rights of third persons 
guaranteed under the Basic Law (see A Bleckmann, 'Begriindung 
und Anwendungsbereich des Verhaltnismassigkeitsprinzips', 
(1994) 34 JuS 181). It is not clear, however, whether this 
objective principle also constitutes a constitutional core which 
cannot be amended under art. 79(3)GG (G Ress, 'Der 11
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Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit im deutschen Recht', in: H 
Kutscher (Joint ed.), Der Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit in 
europaischen Rechtsordnung (1985) 16).
THREE COMPONENT ELEMENTS
Proportionality in German public law is an elusive concept, 
and its terminology in the case law has been the source of strong 
disagreement among legal writers. Nevertheless, the 
development of jurisprudence and academic theory has fleshed 
out a standardised scrutiny process consisting of three often 
overlapping, but theoretically distinct, elements or sub- 
principles.
Suitability
The first element is the requirement of suitability 
(Geeignetheit). It suggests that a public action be regarded at least 
as suitable for attaining its aim. The examination of this filtering 
element is limited only to the question whether the means 
chosen are considered as 'unsuitable for the purpose' or 
'completely unsuitable' at the time of the legislation. A judicial 
decision with hindsight or even a false interpretation of the 
legislature does not automatically render a measure unsuitable 
and unconstitutional. Only a subsequent change in 
circumstances requires the legislature to repeal or amend the 
law, but this does not mean that the initial prognosis of the 
legislature was unsuitable. Very few means, whether laws or 
measures, have been held to be unsuitable (BVerfGE f7, 307, at 
31ft (prohibition of an agency arranging car lifts); and f9, 330 
at 338 (requirement of retailers to prove the expertise in the 
goods that they handled)).
Necessity
The second element is the requirement of necessity' 
(Erforderlichkeit). This means that the administrative authority- 
must choose the least restrictive among equally effective means.
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The degree of scrutiny depends on such factors as the nature of 
the rights to be protected and the serious effect of interference 
on individuals. The most stringent form of review is disclosed 
when either the legislature or administration is required to 
demonstrate the existence of the least harmful measure. 
Nevertheless, this requirement is subject to an ex ante 
examination by the courts. Administrative agents are obliged to 
choose a measure considered as the least burdensome at the time 
of their decision. This means that if judges find a less injurious 
action with hindsight, this \vill not necessarily make the relevant 
authority's decision unlawful.
Proportionality stricto sensu
The third element is the idea of proportionality in the narrow 
sense. This demands a proper balance between the injury to an 
individual and the public interest in the course of an administrative 
measure. It prohibits those measures where the disadvantage to 
the individual outweighs the advantage to the public or the third 
person. The Basic Law is silent on how to balance and evaluate 
conflicting interests of different nature, but an examination of the 
case law identifies certain variables determining the standard of 
judicial control. These include the nature of the area concerned, 
the value of the purpose to be aimed at, the extent of the 
interference, as well as the nature of the constitutional rights 
affected.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
The most significant aspect of the German theory of 
administrative discretion is that an agent is allowed discretion
o
only where this is expressly provided for in law. Exceptions to 
this requirement are allowed only in limited circumstances. The 
requirement of an express authorisation for administrative 
discretion means that the legislature must attempt to predict 
possible future developments in our society.
Another distinctive feature is that a sharp distinction is drawn 
between two stages of administrative actions: first, the 
interpretation of Tatbestand (constituent elements or definition of 
a provision) and, secondly, the determination of legal effects 
(Rechtsfolge) in particular facts of the case. On the basis of this 
distinction, the BVerfG and the prevailing academic views (H 
Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, llthedn. (1997) 129-31) 
suggest that the specific interpretation of statutory provisions 
(Tatbestand) allows only one correct decision and that courts can 
always examine the legality of this interpretation and even 
replace it with their own. This stringent rule applies even to the 
so-called indeterminate legal concepts (Unbestimmte 
Rechtsbegriffe) within Tatbestand, i.e. those concepts which need to 
be interpreted and made more concrete before they are applied 
to the specific facts of a case, such as public order, public 
interest, unreasonableness, environmentally-harmful effects and 
so on. In contrast, the concept of discretion (Ermessen) is allowed 
to the agents only with respect to their decision concerning legal 
effects. An administrative agent is given a certain margin of 
discretion in choosing one out of many lawful decisions suitable 
for achieving the same legal consequence. It remains 
controversial to what extent courts can ascertain the 
administration's interpretation and application of indeterminate 
legal concepts and replace them with their own judgment 
(Maurer, 130, 131).
Many authors attach qualitative significance to this distinction, 
considering that while the exercise of discretion is a value-laden 
action that needs to take into account the legal purpose and 
consequences, the determination of indeterminate legal 
concepts is a cognitive exercise which can be reviewed 
objectively. However, it is doubtful how much practical use there 
is in retaining this distinction, as in many cases the same 
legislative objective can be effectively attained either by 
indeterminate legal concepts in Tatbestand or by the discretion 
concerning legal effects (Maurer, 141). One can recognise the 
symbiotic relationship between the two processes, considering 
that it is possible to select one of many lawful decisions only 
where the Tatbestand of the relevant provision has been 
determined. Administrative discretion is essential for 
supplementing the Tatbestand and adjusting its legal effects to 
particular circumstances (F Ossenbiihl, 'Rechtsquellen und 
Rechtsbindungen der Verwaltung' in H-U Erichsen (ed.), 
Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, llth edn. (1998) 203).
Against this background, the principle of proportionality serves 
as a yardstick for ascertaining and controlling whether the result 
of discretion, be it actions or omissions, is lawful or not (Ress, 
26). Proportionality and discretion should be deemed as two 
sides of the same coin, as the scope of discretion hinges on the 
standard of proportionality. A failure to conform to the principle 
of proportionality constitutes a wrongful use of discretion that 
nullifies the administrative act. It is possible to consider that a
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stringent application of proportionality effectively removes any 
scope of discretion, requiring an administrative authority to 
adopt only one of the legal consequences. For example, the 
BVerfG has held that, in the absence of a genuine danger caused
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by remand prisoners, the choice left to the administrative 
authority is none other than to lift the ban on receiving parcels 
(BVerfGE 34, 384).
Strictness of review
In evaluating the level of scrutiny, particular attention must be 
paid to the questions whether and to what degree the judicial 
review involves any meaningful examination of facts and laws. 
German judicial control goes beyond ascertaining whether or 
not a measure is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable in relation 
to the purpose pursued. A lax review should be disclosed unless 
the review focuses on the positive rather than negative proof of 
whether a specific action is actually necessary and proportionate 
(E Grabitz, 'Der Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit in der 
Rechtsprechnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts' (1973) 98 
A6R 576).
Apart from the degree of interference the standard of scrutiny 
depends on the nature of rights concerned, varying from a highly 
strict examination of any infringement of civil and political rights 
to a relatively lax review as regards interference with fundamental 
rights of an economic nature (freedom to choose and exercise a 
profession and the right to own property). Such variations are 
based on an apparent, albeit not explicit, hierarchy of rights: 
while administrative actions encroaching on civil and political 
rights imply an infringement of the democratic foundation of the 
constitution, economic rights need to be weighed against the 
requirements of the welfare state. On the one hand, interference 
with civil rights must be scrutinised more rigorously than the 
merely 'not-reasonable' test and accompanied by an extensive 
examination; on the other, judges tend to defer to the discretion 
of the legislature and administration in respect of the choice and 
form of necessary measures in the area of economic policy. The 
BVerfG has required that the 'objective effectiveness' of a less 
restrictive alternative be established 'unambiguously in every 
respect'. It may be argued that such a stringent requirement is no 
different from a burden of proof placed on individual applicants. 
However, the standard of control over economic rights depends 
on the combination of more complex factors. As regards the right 
to choose and exercise a profession under art. 12 GG, the BVerfG 
has established a three-tier control (Drei-Stufen-Theorie), applying 
different standards of review to each of the three aspects: exercise 
of profession, subjective and objective requirements for the 
choice of profession (BVerfGE 7, 377, at 399ff in particular, 
401 9, 431, 432 and 442: pharmacy judgment).
legislature's task in this respect is even more complicated as the 
Basic Law is again silent on whether some constitutional rules 
override others. The drafter of the Basic Law has left only small 
clues, explicitly allowing certain basic rights to be regulated by 
legislation. Apart from such an express limitation, it is possible 
to consider that the constitution implicitly authorises the 
legislature to restrict even unreservedly guaranteed rights, but 
only in furtherance of other constitutional values (Grabitz, 576, 
577). Nevertheless, no infringement of the essential content of 
fundamental rights is allowed under art. 19(2)GG.
CONCLUSION
The application of the principle of proportionality has often 
been criticised for being so strict that it leaves little room for 
administrative discretion. Some also warn that a frequent and 
rigorous application of proportionality would lead to 'judicial 
legislation' in breach of the separation of powers, as judicial 
interpretation may override the scope of the rules intended by 
the legislature (Ress, 10). They argue that the power of balancing 
should be limited to cases where it is necessary to remedy 
unreasonable consequences that a literal application of laws may 
cause individuals (F Ossenbiihl, Der Grundsatz der 
Verhaltnismassigkeit des Grundrechtseingriffs' (1997) 12 Jura 
610 21). In contrast, Maurer emphasises the historical 
significance attached to art. 19(4)GG, which is designed to 
protect individuals through the courts against encroachment by 
the state after the bitter experience under the Nazis. As he 
maintains, if this strict requirement no longer matches social 
needs, it is the task of the legislature to amend it, and the 
administrative authorities or judges are not allowed to make any 
restrained interpretation (Maurer, 143).
It is unlikely that the rigid features of proportionality' and 
administrative discretion will be changed in jurisprudence in the 
near future. Recent decisions have reaffirmed the BVerfG's 
consistent policy and dominant role in the protection of 
fundamental rights (Nolte, 208, 209; BVerfGE 83, 130; and 84, 
59). Stringent judicial control over administrative discretion is 
embedded in Germany's special historical experience and 
buttressed by the post-war legal consciousness underpinning the 
requirements of Rechtsstaat, effective judicial remedy and due 
process (J Schwarze, European Administrative Law (1992) 272). At 
a time when the incorporation of proportionality is being hotly 
debated in England, it is of considerable importance to 
comparative lawyers to appreciate the particular historical 
consciousness underlying the German principle of 
proportionality'. ®
Limitations
The principle of proportionality is subject to limitations on its 
scope of application and effectiveness by virtue of certain 
constitutional mandates. Such limitation is justified on the 
ground of the separation of powers, and more precisely, judicial 
deference to the democratic legislator (N Emiliou, The Principle 
of Proportionality in European Law (1996) 36 7). The Basic Law 
lacks any guideline on how to balance competing, but equally 
important, constitutional values and interests. The legislator is 
authorised to balance the relative values of conflicting private 
and communal interests in order to achieve a just result. The
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